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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
.
 S T A T £ Q F x ||; 1 : c , , . 
PHYLLIS LANG, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
J l iOIiKKT I, \M1, 
Defendanij 
SAMV^T T HARTER, 
Intervenor-RespondenL 
PETITION FOR REHEARIiM, ub 
INTER VENOR-RESPONPF X T 
TO Liir. nuAuiiAIJLh SUPREME COURT OF T11F 
STATE OF UTAH: 
The intervenor-respondent (properly designated 
garnishee-respondent) above named respectfully peti-
tions this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the appeal 
in the above entitled cause and in support of this petition 
represents to the Court as follows: 
1 "H , t.:;iM)ishee-respondent reserves his argued 
position as to each '>p 'he points of appeal but ill this 
petition n<l<lr<>ssos I•; M i - - -1 f solely to those features of the 
Case 
No. 
1 0225 
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decision wherein it is believed by him that the Court 
may be convinced its result is based upon the application 
of incorrect legal principles. 
2. Therefore this petition is devoted to convincing 
the Honorable Court that it has erred in its determination 
that the garnishee-respondent, an executor appointed by 
the Superior Court of Orange County, California, is 
subject to the orders and processes of courts of the 
State of Utah in so far as the assets of the California 
estate are concerned. 
POINT 1 
THE COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE MOTION 
OF THE GARNISHEE-RESPONDENT TO STRIKE 
CERTAIN IRRELEVANT AND EXTRANEOUS 
MATTERS FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL, THE 
GARNISHEE-RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A 
RULING ON THIS MOTION. 
Point I of the garnishee-respondent's chief brief on 
appeal reads as follows: .. • 
"The motion of garnishee-respondent Carter, 
Executor of the Estate of Robert Lang, deceased, 
filed in this Court and cause to strike from the 
record on appeal certain documents and papers 
should be granted." 
The Court's opinion entirely ignored garnishee-respon-
dent's motion to strike certain irrelevant and extraneous 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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matters from the record on appeal. There is a definite 
implication in the Court's opinion that the Court, not-
withstanding the pendency of this motion before it, con-
sidered statements of the plaintiff-appellant contained 
in these irrelevant and extraneous documents. Garnishee-
respondent emphatically reasserts his argument in sup-
port of the striking of these documents from the record 
on appeal. He respectfully requests the Court not only 
to consider his motion but also to carefully read his 
argument in support thereof. Unless there is a definitive 
ruling on this motion it is most difficult to tell from the 
opinion whether it is based only upon the facts set 
forth in the legitimate and proper record on appeal or 
whether the Court considered matters set forth in these 
documents which have no relevancy to the legal issues 
involved in this case. 
POINT H 
THE COURT HAS WHOLLY IGNORED THE FACT 
THAT ALL LEGAL PROCESS IN THIS ACTION 
RAN AGAINST CARTER IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
CALIFORNIA EXECUTOR APPOINTED BY THE 
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT AND NOT 
AGAINST CARTER AS AN INDIVIDUAL. 
The Court uses this language to justify its decision: 
"The ends of justice are not best served 
by being unduly concerned with niceties as to 
names or titles. To accomplish its objectives it is 
often necessary to disregard technicalities of 
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nomenclature and look to substance and to the 
basic rights of the parties involved. In doing 
so here, it will be seen that the fundamental facts 
are that Mr. Carter, by whatever title he may be 
addressed, was here in the state of Utah; that he 
had in his possession here money which it had 
been judicially determined belonged to Robert 
Lang; and which had been ordered paid over to 
the latter." 
The disregard of what the Court designated as "tech-
nicalities of nomenclature" has resulted not only in a 
miscarriage of justice in this particular case but has 
also set a precedent which will be productive of vicious 
litigation in the future. The garnishee-respondent (inter-
venor-respondent) repeats for the purpose of emphasis 
the statement contained in his original brief in this 
action: 
"The copy of the writ of garnishment served 
on 'Carter (R-l) was addressed to him in his 
capacity as Executor. He answered the same in 
his capacity as 'Executor of the Estate of John 
Lang, deceased' (E- l ) , and by his answers he 
specifically declared that his possession of the 
sum of $9,375.00 was in his role as Executor and 
not as an individual. The garnishee judgment 
(R-4) was against 'Samuel J . Carter as Executor 
of the Estate of John Lang, deceased'; it was not 
against 'Carter as an individual. The garnishee 
execution (R-5) based on said garnishee judgment 
was against Carter as Executor. The notice of 
appeal in this action (R-17) is designated the 
order appealed from as 'setting aside, annulling 
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and declaring void that certain garnishee judg-
ment rendered in this action on the 28th day of 
February, 1964, against Samuel J. Carter, Exe-
cutor of the Estate of John Lang and in favor 
of plaintiff above named' (B-17)." (Italics sup-
plied). (Page 16). 
The disregard by the Court of the actualities in this 
case and the attempt to serve the "ends of justice" denies 
all principles of the judicial process. I t is simply the 
adoption of the assertion by plaintiff-appellant found 
at the top of page 12 of her brief to the effect that "the 
proceeding is not against Mr. Carter in his representative 
capacity as the Executor of the Estate of John Lang 
but rather in his capacity as a personal debtor to the 
defendant. In the subject case no attempt is being made 
to substitute Mr. Carter as a party for the deceased." 
This quoted assertion of the plaintiff-appellant is not 
supported by the record on appeal, and the Court in its 
opinion made itself a party to this misstatement of 
the plaintiff-appellant. The Court has literally taken 
an eraser in hand and erased from the writ of garnish-
ment, the answer of the garnishee-appellant, the garnishee 
judgment and the garnishee execution the words "Samuel 
J. Carter as Executor of the Estate of John Lang, 
deceased" and substituted simply the name "Samuel J . 
Carter." By this action it has made Mr. Carter the 
holder and possessor of certain funds, and charges Mr. 
Carter individually and personally with a liability and 
responsibility which the record on appeal cannot and 
does not support. 
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The argument of the Court as found in the above 
quotation from its opinion will permit it in any case 
to recast the facts in order to achieve what it considers 
"the ends of justice." The effect of such judicial action 
will be to destroy all symmetry of the judicial process 
and render judicial precedents valueless in the deter-
mination of the rule of law governing a given situation. 
The observance by the Court of the actual facts of this 
case as disclosed by the record on appeal would not 
have permitted it to reverse the action of the Trial Court. 
POINT ffl 
THE DECISION IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DIA-
METRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE DECISION IN 
WILCOX VS. DISTRICT COURT, AND HAS RE-
SULTED IN PRODUCING CONFUSION AND UN-
CERTAINTY WHICH IN THE FUTURE WILL 
SPELL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE COURT ITSELF 
AND RENDER PROBATE ADMINISTRATION UN-
CERTAIN. 
The Court attempts in Footnote 5 to distinguish 
Wilcox vs. District Court, 2 Utah (2d), 227, 272 Pac.(2d), 
157, by asserting that in Wilcox there was "the attempt 
to have the Utah Court assert jurisdiction over a Cal-
ifornia appointed executrix who was in California so 
that the persons and the assets were in California." 
Chief Justice Henriod in his dissenting opinion in this 
case emphatically denies this interpretaton of Wilcox. 
The garnishee-respondent supports the Chief Justice in 
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this assertion. The decision simply holds that "No action 
can be maintained against any administrator outside 
the state of his appointment upon a claim against the 
estate of decedent." In Wilcox, an attempt was made 
to cause the California executrix to be substituted as a 
defendant in a divorce action instituted in Utah, and 
to cause judgment to be entered against her as such 
for the amount found due for the unpaid support money. 
It was an active attempt to subject a California executrix 
to the processes of the Utah Court, just as in this case 
the plaintiff-appellant has attempted to subject the 'Cal-
ifornia executor to the garnishment processes of ' 
Utah Court. _. rilcox remains the law in Utah, then 
the decision of the Court in the instant action is wrong. 
If the decision in the instant case is allowed to stand 
as the law of the State of Utah, then the Court should 
forthrightly and directly overrule Wilcox and announce 
that in Utah a foreign executor and administrator may 
be sued if the process server can catch him in the State 
of Utah. The rule of Wilcox and the rule announced in 
the instant case are in direct conflict. The Court must 
either denounce Wilcox as bad law or grant this petition 
for rehearing. 
It is easy to imagine situations which are certain 
to arise if foreign executors and administrators can be 
sued in Utah. Let us take this example: "X" is appointed 
the executor of the estate of "Y", a California resident, 
by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. 
There is an individual residing at St. George, Utah, 
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who asserts that "Y" was indebted to him at the time 
of his death. "X", while passing through St. George 
on his way to Zion Park, is served by the sheriff of 
Washington County with summons and complaint in an 
action instituted in the District 'Court of Washington 
County against "X" as executor by the alleged Utah 
creditor. The creditor had theretofore presented his 
claim to "X" as executor and it had been denied ^payment. 
The Superior 'Court, sitting in probate, had approved 
the action of the executor. The answer to the legal prob-
lem presented by this hypothetical set of facts if solved 
by the application of the rule announced in the instant 
case produces a situation which is intolerable. "X", as 
executor, is answerable to the Superior Court of Cali-
fornia and yet he is compelled because of the rule announ-
ced in the instant case to employ counsel and defend 
himself as 'California executor in a Utah court on a claim 
which has been denied by a California court. Assume fur-
ther that the Utah creditor secures a judgment of the Utah 
court against "X" as executor. Here we have a situation 
where the denial of the claim was approved by the Cali-
fornia court sitting in probate but which is the subject of a 
Utah judgment. There is then and there injected into 
the situation the question as to whether or not the Utah 
judgment is entitled to the protection of the "full faith 
and credit" clause of the Federal 'Constitution (Article 
IV, Section I, Constitution of the United States of Amer-
ica). There is further serious constitutional question 
created by this situation as to whether or not the Utah 
judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
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the Federal Constitution because of lack of due process 
of law. The rule as announced by the Court in the instant 
case has buried in it these fundamental problems of law 
under the Federal Constitution. (McMaster v. Gould, 239 
N. Y. 606,147 N.E. 214; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 
128 N.E. 216.) 
The garnishee-respondent repeats his declaration 
contained in his original brief that Carter was biefore the 
District Court 
"as Executor of the Lang Estate and not as an in-
dividual. He is before this Court in his role as exe-
cutor and not as an individual. The plaintiff-
appellant by her own action chose to bring Carter 
before the Court in his representative capacity, 
and not as an individual." (Pages 16-17, Brief of 
Garnishee-Bespondent.) 
Further, the garnishee-respondent repeats and re-
emphasizes this statement contained in his original Brief: 
"The funds held by Carter as Executor until 
actually paid by him to the person entitled thereto 
remained part of the assets of the 'California 
estate and were under the jurisdiction and protec-
tion of the Orange County Superior Court. While 
Carter acknowledged in his garnishment answer 
that he was indebted as executor to J. Robert 
Lang, this acknowledgment was simply his state-
ment of an indebtedness due from the California 
executor to Lang. Unless and until Carter as 
executor paid these funds to Lang they remained 
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part of the California estate. There had been no 
segregation of the same from the general assets 
of the estate. These funds did not arise from 
a distribution of the California estate to the de-
visees or legatees of John Lang, deceased. Noth-
ing in the record on appeal denies that these funds, 
together with all other assets of the estate were 
within the State of 'California and not within the 
jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The consequence 
is that no judgment of a Utah court could affect 
this res which was beyond its jurisdiction." Pages 
24-25, Brief of Cirarnishee-Respondent). 
The questions under the Federal Constitution as 
demonstrated by the hypothetical case above set forth 
exist with respect to the judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff-appellant against 'Carter as California executor of 
the estate of John Lang, deceased. Carter as executor 
is answerable to the Superior 'Court of Orange County, 
California. Must the California Superior Court honor 
this judgment against Carter as executor under the "full 
faith and credit" clause of the federal Constitution, or is 
the judgment based on such a frail foundation that it 
is void under the Fourteenth Amendment and need not 
be recognized by the California court? It is repeated 
again that these funds were not funds distributed to J. 
Robert Lang under a decree of distribution of the Cali-
fornia court. Carter's answer as garnishee declared that 
he held funds as executor of the estate of John Lang, 
deceased, in the Superior Court of California in and for 
the 'County of Orange, and that he had in his possession 
$9,375.00 owing to defendant in settlement of an action 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"brought against me as such executor by defendant ayid 
others." These funds were the fruit of litigation and 
were not funds given by the testator, John Lang, to his 
son. They remained part of the California assets until 
paid by Carter as executor to Lang. Regardless of where 
the funds were deposited Carter's primary responsibility 
to account for same was and is to the 'California court, 
and yet this Court in the instant case requires Carter 
as executor to pay them to the plaintiff-appellant. There 
is a direct conflict of jurisdiction, and the validity of 
this garnishee judgment is vitiated by the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution above cited. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF BRISTOL VS. BRENT (38 
UTAH 58; 110 PAC. 356) WAS ENTIRELY IGNOR-
ED BY THE COURT IN ITS DECISION. THIS DOC-
TRINE SUSTAINS THE DISTRICT COURT IN 
HOLDING THE GARNISHEE JUDGMENT VOID. 
Attention is invited to the quotation from the deci-
sion in Bristol vs. Brent found at pages 25 and 26 of 
the garnishee-respondents original brief. The Court, 
in order to sustain its ruling in this case, must overrule 
Bristol vs. Brent and not ignore it. J. Robert Lang 
could not have sued Carter as California executor of 
the estate of John Lang, deceased, in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, if the Court considers that 
Wilcox vs. District Court still declares the law in Utah. 
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Since J. Robert Lang could not have sued 'Carter in the 
Utah court, the plaintiff-appellant cannot secure a garn-
ishee judgment against Carter as executor in an action 
against said J. Robert Lang. 
WHEREFORE, the garnishee-respondent respect-
fully prays the Honorable Court for relief as follows: 
1. That the Honorable Court grant the garnishee-
respondent a rehearing in the above entitled action, and 
that upon said rehearing the judgment of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in this action be 
affirmed; 
2. That in the event the Honorable Court denies the 
garnishee-respondent a rehearing in this action that it 
particularly consider the points raised by the garnishee-
respondent in this petition for rehearing with respect 
to the application of the "full faith and credit" clause 
of the Federal Constitution and the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution to 
the judgment against the garnishee-respondent in favor 
of the plaintiff-appellant, and that to evidence said con-
sideration by the Court of the constitutional questions 
thus raised as a result of said consideration that it declare 
for the purpose of the record that it considered these 
Federal constitutional questions in denying this petition 
for rehearing, and that the Federal constitutional ques-
tions were the basis of its denial of this petition rather 
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than any rule of State law. And the garnishee-respondent 
will forever pray. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Attorneys for Garnishee-Respondent 
(Intervenor-Respondent) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, FRANKLIN RITER, one of the attorneys for 
the Intervenor - Respondent (Garnishee - Respondent), 
hereby certify that on the^^^l -day of July, 1965, three 
copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were 
mailed by me to Dudley M. Amos, attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant; said copies of said Petition were inclosed 
in an envelope with postage prepaid, addressed to said 
Amoss at 974 East 3 j ^ South Street, j§j$t» Lake City, 
Utah. 
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